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Abstract 
 
Purpose – This paper examines how differences in the institutional environment of a 
multinational enterprise (MNE) shape the role of management control systems (MCSs) and 
social capital in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship of an emerging economy MNE.  
Design/methodology/approach – A case study design was adopted in this research. Data was 
gathered by means of semi-structured interviews, document analysis and observations. 
Interviews were conducted at the Nigerian headquarter (HQ) and United Kingdom (UK) 
subsidiary of the Nigerian multinational enterprise. 
Findings – The study found that the subsidiary operated autonomously, given its residence in a 
stronger institutional environment than the HQ. Instead of the HQ depending on MCSs as a 
means of coordination and control, it relied on social capital that existed between the HQ and the 
subsidiary to coordinate and integrate the operation of the foreign subsidiary studied. 
Originality/value – The reliance on social capital as a means of coordination and control of the 
foreign subsidiary in this study is significant, given that previous studies have indicated that 
multinational HQs normally employ MCSs as a means of control of foreign subsidiaries. Also, 
while previous studies have suggested that MNEs HQs have better expertise which enables them 
to design and transfer MCSs to foreign subsidiaries, this study found that such expertise relates 
to the institutional environment from which the HQ is operating from. Through the lens of 
institutional sociology theory and social capital theory, these findings directly contribute to the 
literature on the transference of practices and control systems in accounting and international 
business literatures. 
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Introduction 
The literature on management control systems (MCS) in multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
suggests that controls are normally designed and transferred from the headquarters (HQ) to the 
subsidiaries (Hyvonen, 2008; Coates et al., 1992).  This argument is predicated on the 
conventional understanding of MNEs having their HQ in developed countries, which possess 
stronger institutional and operating environments as well as better expertise than their 
subsidiaries, which are often based in less developed countries (LCDs). This understanding is 
however increasingly challenged, given the growing number of MNEs having their HQ in LDCs 
and subsidiaries in developed countries (Guillén and García-Canal 2009; Mathews, 2006; 
Yadong and Huaichuan, 2009; Yadong, 2005). The dynamics of this type of HQ-subsidiary 
relationship raises issues about the design and transferability of controls from HQ to subsidiaries. 
However, less is known about how developing country based MNEs influence management 
control in their developed country based subsidiaries. This paper addresses this gap in the 
accounting and international business literatures. 
MNEs are business corporations that operate (have facilities and other assets) in more than one 
country (Chang and Taylor, 1999). An MNE “consists of a group of geographically dispersed 
and goal disparate organizations that include its HQ and the different national subsidiaries” 
(Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990, p.603). The dispersal of assets, however, comes with the critical 
tasks of the coordination, control and integration of the activities across geographically dispersed 
subunits (Roth and Kostova, 2003; Mathews, 2006; Kostova et al., 2008). Furthermore, the 
complexity in operating an MNE increases because different cultural values, norms and 
ethnicities are intertwined (Buckley and Ghauri, 2004; Cantwell et al., 2010). For example, the 
employees of an MNE bring into the organisation different attitudes, values, and goals, which 
create a complex relationship that may cause interpersonal conflicts and uncertainties (Tan and 
Mahoney, 2006; Harzing and Feely, 2008; Cantwell et al., 2010).  
Chang and Taylor (1999) argued that conflict and uncertainties can be reduced if the HQ of an 
MNE tries to increase control over foreign subsidiaries. They noted that MCSs “ensures that the 
behaviours originating in separate parts of the organisation are compatible and support common 
goals” (p.542). Foreign subsidiaries of MNEs are thus subjected to internal organisational 
pressures to adopt structures and controls that have been designed at the HQ; however, they may 
adopt the controls to varying degrees (Kostova and Roth, 2002) depending on their operating 
environment. Thus, the subsidiary’s response is influenced by the external institutional 
environment as well as the internal environment of the enterprise (Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
Kostova and Roth (2003) suggested “informal approaches” to the coordination of organisational 
activities where the capacity of formal structures as the elements for coordination and integration 
of HQ-subsidiary operations is constrained by the institutional environment. Such might be the 
case where the HQ is based in a weak institutional and operating environment.  However, the 
different dynamics of the HQ-subsidiary relationship with regards to how the subsidiary’s 
operations are coordinated and controlled by the HQ remains a largely unexplored area of 
research, despite its potential to enrich the debate in this space. This area of study is even more 
insightful, given the evidence which suggests that MCSs in organisations in LDCs are 
politicised, shaped by ethnicity and hardly used as control and coordinating mechanisms (Hopper 
et al., 2009; Tsamenyi et al, 2008; Efferin and Hopper, 2007; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 
2005). Factors such as culture, religion and the socio-political attributes of a LDC’s institutional 
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environment have been suggested as having the potential to shape MCSs (Tsamenyi et al., 2004; 
Hopper et al., 2003). Yet, the design and use of MCSs between developing country HQ and 
developed country subsidiary has received almost no attention in prior literature. This research 
attempts to fill this gap by answering the following questions: 
i. To what extent are controls that are designed and used by the HQ of an MNE based in a 
LDC transferred to the subsidiary in a developed country? 
ii. What is the role of social capital in the coordination and control of the subsidiary by the 
HQ? 
Relying on the theoretical lens of the new institutional sociology and social capital theory, we 
examine the determinants of the transference of MCSs from a LDC based MNE to the subsidiary 
in a developed country. This study is contextualised in Nigeria, Africa’s largest market for goods 
and services. A case study of a Nigerian financial services company pseudo named Nigerian 
Service Multinational Enterprise (NSMNE), which is headquartered in Nigeria, and with a UK 
based subsidiary was specifically examined.  The financial services context in Nigeria, which is 
characterised as poor in regulatory quality, high in corruption and low in government 
effectiveness (Kaufmann et al., 2008), provides a useful case study to examine MCSs in weak 
institutional contexts (Amaeshi, Adegbite and Rajwani, 2016). It further provides a good case 
study because it requires balancing local (Nigerian) and international (UK) demands (Amaeshi, 
et. al. 2016). Furthermore, the contrast between the UK’s strong institutional environment and 
Nigeria’s weak institutional environment (Adegbite, 2015), offers an interesting case for 
exploring how differences in institutional environments shape the relationship between the HQ 
and subsidiary of emerging developing country MNE.The rest of this paper is structured as 
follows. Next, we provide a review of relevant literature and theorises our research exploration. 
We then present our methodology, findings and discussions, and finally conclusions. 
 
Literature Review and Theory 
The extant literature on accountability in international businesses suggests that for traditional 
MNEs with HQs in developed countries and subsidiaries in LDCs, controls are mostly designed 
and transferred from the HQ to the subsidiary (Norreklit and Schoenfeld, 2000). This is justified 
on the grounds that the HQ operates in a much stronger institutional environment (Elbashir, 
2011, Hyvonen, 2008), and controls in LDCs are weak and politicised (Chang et al., 2009; 
Ferner, et. al., 2005).  
Hence, studies of MCSs in MNEs have focused largely on the rational/technical view of controls, 
with the assumption that controls are designed for the purposes of efficiency and coordination 
(Canonico, 2010; Woolcock, 1998; Gordon, 2008). MCSs are designed to provide managers with 
information for decision-making and control, in an effective and efficient way (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 2001; Canonico, 2010). MCSs from this perspective are formalised bureaucratic 
systems such as budgets, performance evaluation systems, formal investment appraisals, and 
decision-making processes (Ferner, 2000).  
However, scholars have argued that MCSs could be designed and used for purposes other than 
control (Davila et al., 2009; Gomez and Sanchez, 2005; Tsamenyi et al, 2008). Proponents of this 
perspective posit that MCSs do not necessarily lead to efficiency and coordination (Efferin, 
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2007; Wickramasinghe, 2005; Hopper et al., 2009). They suggest that MCSs are not necessarily 
objective or outside the influence of managers, but are rather socially constructed and context 
determined (Tsamenyi et al, 2008). Thus, the literature on MCSs in MNEs is increasingly 
suggesting a broader scope of controls, including formal and informal controls (Chenhall, 2003; 
Malmi and Brown, 2008; Davila et al., 2009). The pressure on the subsidiary to conform to HQ 
norms/controls while embracing the local institutional context results in a complex iterative and 
interactive level of controls that may require an integration process to make them mutually 
supportive (Yadong, 2005; Norreklit and Schoenfeld, 2000). As a result, a multinational 
subsidiary is likely to operate with two sets of controls: a set of formal control systems designed 
and transferred by the HQ, and a set of controls designed internally and shaped by factors at the 
subsidiary level (Rowley et al., 2000; Woolcock, 2001; Busco et al., 2008). Thus, an interesting 
question to ask is what shapes the extent to which MCSs in a subsidiary is locally driven or HQ 
driven. It will be particularly insightful to also know the extent to which controls that are 
designed and used by the HQ of an MNE based in a LDC are transferred to the subsidiary in a 
developed country. To shed light on these queries and to understand how differences in an MNE 
institutional environment shape the role of MCSs, we rely on the new institutional sociology 
theory and the social capital theory. 
The new institutional sociology (NIS) theory argues that organisational systems are influenced 
by factors from the institutional environment. Hence, organisations may adopt certain processes 
and procedures as a response to the environment to appear legitimate. It seeks to provide answers 
to “old questions about how social choices are shaped, mediated, and channelled by institutional 
arrangements” (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, p.2). It explores how these actions constrain or 
encourage the capacity optimisation abilities of managers and privileged others, securing their 
interests by prevailing rewards and sanctions (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). While most 
organisation theorists emphasised the differentiated and diverse world of organisations and tried 
to provide explanations of the variations in organisational behaviour and structure, the new 
institutionalism  as espoused by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) emerged with a different agenda, 
to explain homogeneity among organisations rather than seek to explain the variations in patterns 
(Fernández-Alles and Valle-Cabrera, 2006; Battilana et al., 2009). 
Scott (1995, 2001) presented a different perspective of institutionalism. He suggests that 
organisations, when impacted upon by external environmental factors, may respond in different 
ways to the influence being exerted on them. This is relevant in this research, since institutional 
theorists suggest that the external factors impacting on organisations can shape the behaviour of 
organisational actors as well as the design and use of control systems within the organisation. 
The new institutional sociology theory in this framework provides the medium for analysing the 
influence of what Powell and DiMaggio (1991) described as exogenous factors.  
However, a major criticism of new institutional sociology theory is that it is too externally 
focused and ignores the internal (endogenous) factors that shape organisational characteristics. 
Critics have argued that it fails to recognise that organisations and their systems are shaped by 
the values, norms of behaviours and beliefs that are held by individuals and groups that work in 
them. Kotsova et al., (2008) for example criticised the NIS notion that organisational survival is 
dependent on the extent to which they are aligned with their institutional environments (p.997). 
They also noted that organisational fields “do not exist in MNC” and the concept of 
organisational field does not apply to MNCs. Philip and Tracey (2009) have challenged this 
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criticism of institutional theory arguing that it refers to a dated version of institutional theory. 
However, these criticisms highlight the lack of consensus in the institutional approach and the 
call for more studies. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) for example proposed that the combination 
of the new and old institutional theories would “provide a model for change that links 
organisational context and intraorganisational dynamics” (p.1024). Hopper and Major (2007) 
confirmed criticisms of early NIS research for neglecting internal organizational dynamics. They 
extended the model of Dillard et al. (2004) by incorporating features such as the role of boundary 
spanners across social levels and how intra-organizational factors play a part. As a result, we 
broaden the scope of the framework used in this study to capture the internal environment of the 
organisation and especially, how social capital and interactions between key actors may 
influence the way MCSs are designed and used. 
Social capital theory enables us to do this. The attributes of social capital theory which includes 
the boundary spanning concept that was incorporated by Hopper and Major (2007) as well as 
elements that have been highlighted by authors that advocates for a combination of the new and 
old institutional theories makes it appropriate for this study (see Abrutyn, and Turner, 2011). 
Social capital is facilitated by interactions with and between networks of actors (Adler and 
Kwon, 2002). Staber (2006) argued that social capital theory offers a useful foundation and “a 
process-oriented perspective” which helps to examine the dynamics embedded in managerial 
practices (p.190). He contended that the theory does not only “seem ideally suited” to explore the 
issues involved in multinational operations but adds to the understanding of these issues and how 
they shape practices by emphasising the role of “agency and intentionality”.  
Social capital constitutes the resources that actors can access due to there being in a network or 
structure of social relations (Adler and Kwon, 2002). It is the “benefits that social actors derive 
from their social structures” (Kostova and Roth, 2003, p.297).  From a multinational perspective, 
Staber (2006, p.190) defined social capital as the “benefits that accrue to a collectivity for 
maintaining cooperative relations between its members”. It refers to the “social relational 
properties and processes of the organizational system” (Staber 2006, p.190) that enable 
coordination and support innovative practices. Social capital is an attribute of successful 
organisations and is reflected in trust, reciprocity and norms of social behaviour that enable 
cooperation and integration of activities by regulating social behaviour (Kostova and Roth, 
2003).  
 
Scholars however, share different opinions on the sources of social capital and have evaluated 
the concept from different perspectives. One perspective views social capital as being generated 
from the collective interactions and shared interests of those within a dense network of strong 
ties. This implies that social capital is a property of close ties or cohesiveness and can be 
accessed by being able to mobilise resources within a network of close relationships (Adler and 
Kwon, 2002, Coleman, 1990). Another view of social capital is a resource that is inherent in 
actors bridging ties with other actors in other networks (Adler and Kwon, 2002;Bowey and 
Easton, 2007). Here, social capital is facilitated by interactions with other groups which an actor 
has direct or indirect contacts with, and it shapes the actions and outcomes of groups or sets an 
individual, unit or firm apart from competitors (Adler and Kwon, 2002). As Adler and Kwon 
(2002) suggest, we view social capital in this study as encompassing both bridging and bonding 
elements.   
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Thus, we use social capital theory in this study to explore how ongoing social relations combine 
with the institutional factors of the environment to shape the relationship between the HQ and 
the subsidiary of an MNE. As Granovetter (1985) argued, institutions that shape organisations 
are themselves so “constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent 
is a grievous misunderstanding” (p.481-482).  Understanding the above argument is becoming 
more pertinent as the structure of MNEs is changing, with a growing number of these 
organisations now having HQs in LDCs and subsidiaries in developed countries (Guillén and 
García-Canal 2009; Mathews, 2006). Yadong and Huaichuan, (2009, p.49) noted that MNEs are 
emerging from LDCs with “business attributes, dominant motivations, evolutionary trajectory, 
and strategic behaviours that are in contrast with those of older (North America, European and 
Japanese) MNEs”. These MNEs from developing countries are not the most advanced in 
technological and managerial expertise, but are increasingly becoming prominent and occupying 
strategic places in the global business arena (Yadong, 2005). It is therefore imperative to 
investigate the extent to which controls that are designed and used by the HQ of the NSMNE 
based in a LDC were used to control and integrate business operations and the role that social 
capital may play in such a setting. 
 
Methodology and Analysis 
 
Research Environment 
Understanding the context of the research sets the background and helps to explore, analyse and 
interpret the key issues discussed by interviewees during the data collection. This is important, 
especially as qualitative research is constructed based on the meanings that social actors make of 
their social contexts (Saunders et al., 2008; Smith and Ragan, 2005). The contexts of this 
research are Nigeria and the UK. On the one hand, Nigeria is a former colony and creation of 
Britain (Falola and Heaton, 2008). While the legacies of British rule remain influential (Ijeoma, 
2002), the Nigerian society is very culturally different.  For example, the notion of “kinship” is 
dominant in the Nigerian society. Kinship is the extension of the responsibility of care to 
extended family members, a situation described as Nigeria’s form of the UK’s social security by 
Limbs and Fort (2000). The responsibility to protect kinsmen poses a challenge to the formal 
systems and structures of controls in organisations. Besides, the cultural difference, customs and 
values of the Nigerian people make it challenging for enterprises that are structured per the 
western legacies left by Britain to establish locally viable control systems. As a developing 
country, Nigeria is faced with many of the problems common to such countries. Prominent 
among these is the level of illiteracy, poverty, political tensions and corruption (UNESCO, 2015; 
Kaufmann et al., 2008; Adegbite, 2015).  
Corruption is one of Nigeria’s biggest challenges (Olu-Adeyemi, 2012, Olotu and Ogunro, 
2013). According to KPMG’s Africa Fraud Barometer (2012), Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and 
South Africa are responsible for 74% of fraud cases in the continent. Government officials and 
senior management staff of MNEs were among the worst perpetrators of fraudulent activities in 
Nigeria (Randle, 2012). Corruption in the private sector has been conventionally problematic, 
owing to weak regulation of the governance and conduct of businesses. This is especially the 
case in the financial services industry, which is regulated by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
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(Tahir, Adegbite and Guney, 2016; Adegbite, 2012). The state of the financial services’ 
regulatory environment and the effectiveness of policy-making bodies are important to this study 
because they shape the control structures and behaviours prevalent in companies (Child and Tsai, 
2005).  
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has a well-established and stable system of government. 
In comparison with Nigeria, the UK has a strong institutional context, with stable politics and 
polity, government and regulatory effectiveness and lower levels of corruption (Kaufmann et al., 
2008). Furthermore, the British common law principles have become the applicable standard of 
legal practice in most of its former colonies and a point of reference in other countries 
(Huntington, 1984, Lijphart, 1991). The separation of power between the judiciary, legislative 
and executive arms of government is important for the effectiveness of the system (Halliday, 
2011).  The institutional profile of Britain reflects a contradiction to Nigeria. Understanding the 
institutional contexts of the research is important because institutional contexts shape social 
meaning and become reflected on how people make sense of social reality (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977) and employ social capital. It is from this understanding that we attempt to address our 
research questions. 
 
Method 
This paper adopted a qualitative approach that involved semi-structured interviews, observations, 
and document analysis.  This enabled the triangulation of evidence and increased the reliability 
of the data collected. This approach is useful because elements such as beliefs, norms, and 
culture are part of the institutional environments and are better captured qualitatively. 
Furthermore, Alawattage et al. (2007) argued that it is sensible to rely on qualitative methods, in 
sites where access to reliable data from quantitative methods may prove difficult. Our 
methodology is consistent with the broad accounting and international business literature in 
developing countries, especially Nigeria (see Adegbite, 2015; Amaeshi et. al. 2016). 
Case study 
To anonymise our case study, we refer to it as the Nigerian Service Multinational Enterprise 
(NSMNE). The NSMNE has over 700 branches that provide a comprehensive range of retail and 
corporate financial services in Nigeria. It has international subsidiaries and representative offices 
in many African countries, as well as in Europe and in Asia. 
  
As one of the leaders in the sector, the NSMNE has played a key role in the financing of private 
investments in infrastructure development in the Nigerian economy.  The NSMNE’s 
contributions to the Nigerian financial services sector have been recognised by international 
publishers such as The Financial Times Group.  It has a primary listing on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange, where it is one of the most capitalized companies. The NSMNE is owned by over 1 
million shareholders across the world and has an unlisted Global Depositary Receipt (GDR) 
programme. It has strong ratings from Standard & Poor’s and Fitch and attained Information 
Security Management Systems (ISMS) certification from the British Standards Institution (BSI). 
The organisation has been operating nationally in Nigeria for over 50 years and has over 5 
million customers nationwide. It has now become international; with a wholly-owned subsidiary 
in the UK and operational presence in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. It 
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is a “full-spectrum” financial services provider, a conglomerate whose operations rank among 
the most diversified on the African continent. The NSMNE has a strong capital adequacy ratio of 
20.04% which is twice the CBN mandated minimum of 10%. Customer deposit is worth over 
$9.4 billion and the value of total assets is over $12.6 billion. The NSMNE is one of the largest 
corporate and retail financial institutions in sub-Saharan Africa and pride itself as a reputable 
enterprise with good corporate governance and effective risk management. 
The foregoing highlights our rationale for the choice of the NSMNE as the case study for this 
research. It is also one of the few emerging MNEs from Africa that has international presence in 
Europe.   An MNE that operates in the UK was imperative for various reasons. First, policies and 
practices of the Nigerian institutional environment have been largely shaped by the colonial past 
that Nigeria shares with the UK. Second, the institutional environment of the UK as a developed 
country is in contrast with Nigeria as a developing country in terms of culture, norms and values 
and other practices. The contrasting nature of the two institutional environments offers an ideal 
setting for exploring how the institutional environment shapes the relationship between the HQ 
and the subsidiary of an MNE. Third, the researchers understand the socio-cultural, political and 
economic environments of both countries and can communicate with participants in their 
languages.  
Data Collection 
Data collection spanned four months at the Nigerian HQ and UK subsidiary of the NSMNE in 
the last quarter of 2012. Data was collected at all management levels at the headquarters (in 
Nigeria) and the UK subsidiary office in London. Non-managerial staff were also interviewed.  
 
NSMNE staff members working at various levels were interviewed. This approach ensured that 
the data collected were more reliable and objective. It further ensured that rich data that 
represented the different views of participants were assessed and compared. An understanding of 
the role of staff members, and an observation of reporting activities, were crucial in the selection 
of staff members for interviews, since the interview process targeted the key decision-makers in 
NSMNE. Data was gathered from managers of different departments in the organisation, the 
directors they reported to, and any superior officer in the hierarchy that the directors may also 
report to. The interviewees were asked to comment on how differences in the institutional 
environment shaped the nature of MCSs in the organisation. Questions focused on the design and 
use of MCSs, the institutional and social capital factors that shape the process and the resulting 
implication for the HQ-subsidiary relationship.  
A similar set of questions were employed in the interviews with directors and the managers, but 
with variations to the structure of questions, particularly, to fit their job descriptions. This gave 
an understanding of staff’s impact and social capital on the organisation, and how that shapes the 
design and use of MCSs. It also helped in understanding the relationship between the 
headquarters and subsidiary of the NSMNE.  
A total of 35 participants were involved in the research. Out of the 35 participants, 10 were from 
the UK subsidiary, while the remaining 25 were interviewed at the Nigerian headquarters. 
Interviews were tape-recorded, in cases where participants gave their consent. Where 
participants objected, notes were taken. To ensure anonymity, codes were developed based on 
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the job functions of interviewees. Codes
1
 like BOM1, AOM1 and HBS
2
 were used to identify 
interview participants and indicate the positions they occupy in the company. Participants from 
the UK were identified using the prefix UK. The interviews lasted between 50 minutes each, on 
the average. We note that interviewees’ responses may be subjective and only recount their 
views of events which may emphasise aspects that interest them (Shotter & Gergen, 1994). To 
deal with the potential bias of interviews, documentary evidences were requested where possible 
and were analysed for consensus (Saunders et al., 2008). 
 
Data Analysis 
Partial analysis of the data collected early in the empirical stage was started while more data 
were being collected. This was done to enable an understanding of the key issues arising from 
the process that may not have been put into consideration in the initial design of the data 
collection instruments. Analysis at the initial stage was focused on the notes taken and not 
recorded interviews.  
The actual analysis of data was a five-stage process. The first stage involved transcribing the 
tape-recorded data from the empirical process. The second stage involved reading through the 
data and making notes to aid easier coding. The third stage was the coding of data. The NVivo 
10 software was used for this process. Data coding followed an open coding process.  Key 
themes upon which the interview guide was design were used to form the structure (parent 
nodes) for the NVivo codes. During the coding process, emerging themes that did not fit into the 
initial classification of nodes were set up either as sub-nodes of existing nodes or as parent 
nodes. However, not all the data collected during the empirical study could be fitted into nodes. 
Cresswell (2014) argued that qualitative data are “so dense and rich, not all of the information 
can be used in a qualitative study” (p.195). Hence, only information relevant to the subject of the 
research was coded. Our inter-coder reliability was over 80%. We conducted a timeline to 
answer our two main research questions, using developed nodes to support the development of 
theoretical logics from our data (see: Amaeshi, et. al. 2016). The next part discusses our findings, 
using anonymised data from our case study.  
 
 
Findings and Discussions 
Our findings are divided into 5 sub sections. We first discuss the role of MCSs in the HQ-
subsidiary relationship. We then discuss the institutional factors shaping the extent of subsidiary 
autonomy and the business relationship with the HQ. The third section discusses social capital as 
a means of coordination and integration in the absence of imposed controls. Next, we consider 
the significance of the subsidiary to the NSMNE and organisational social capital. The fifth 
section discusses subsidiary staffing and potential social capital risk.  
The role of MCSs in the Headquarters-subsidiary relationship 
Dacin et al. (2002) suggests that the differences in institutional environments between the HQ 
and subsidiary of MNEs may determine the relationship between them as well as the strategy 
                                                          
1 Corresponding author will on request provide further information on the interpretation of the codes that have been 
used in this research to refer to the different interviewees. 
 
2
 BOM and AOM stand for Branch manager and Area manager respectively, while HBS stand for Head of Business 
strategy. 
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that would be followed to implement the HQ strategic objectives, including MNCs (see also, 
Rozkwitalska, 2013). Given the differences between the institutional environments of the HQ 
and subsidiary in our study, our findings indicate that the subsidiary of the NSMNE is operating 
autonomously. This means that rather than integrating HQ-subsidiary strategies through 
imposing structures and controls, the LDC HQ seeks to benefit strategically from the developed 
country location of the subsidiary. An interviewee expressed it in the following words: “What we 
integrate is not the strategy, what we integrate is what I call the aspirations. So, we may not 
align the content of the strategy, but the expected result is what we align together” (HBS). 
This finding is consistent with that of Hunschild and Chandler (2008) who argued that 
institutional pressures could lead to divergent practices rather than similarities in practices, as the 
mimetic isomorphism of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggests. Given the challenges of the 
Nigerian institutional environment, the HQ seeks to establish its international reputation through 
the UK subsidiary. The stability and advancement of the UK institutional environment, gives 
companies more confidence dealing with the NSMNE. An interviewee maintained that:  
“There are several reasons why operating in the UK is of such strategic importance to us 
(NSMNE). Companies may consider the level of risks associated with dealing with a UK 
firm more acceptable than dealing with a firm that is operating from Nigeria. For example, 
there is economic and political stability in the UK and a functioning legal system (in 
comparison to Nigeria) which might give companies the assurance that they can seek legal 
redress and get a fair hearing if a contract has not been enforced as agreed” (AOM1).  
The UK environment is in contrast with Nigeria, where the rule of law may be disregarded and a 
fair hearing difficult to get if legal actions are taken because of the weak legal and regulatory 
system (Innocent, 2011). As new institutional sociology (NIS) theory explains (Collier, 2001), 
the NSMNE depends on the subsidiary to gain external legitimacy and to be perceived as an 
enterprise devoid of the negatives of the institutional environment in which it is headquartered. 
Dacin et al. (2007) argued that the type of legitimacy that a firm needs and constituent to which a 
firm must appear legitimate are shaped by the objectives that a firm intends to achieve in an 
environment, as well as the firm’s characteristics and the characteristics of the environment. 
Powell and DiMaggio (1991) argued that if organisations are perceived as being like other 
successful organisations that are operating in the same environment, this gives legitimacy 
(credibility and acceptance) to the organisation. Our findings indicate a general perception that 
the actions or activities of the NSMNE were desirable within the socially constructed system of 
beliefs, values and norms of the UK institutional environment, helping the MNE to detach from 
the negative institutional perception of its HQ. Our findings also reveal that this divergent path 
was not only necessary for the subsidiary’s success in the UK, but was only practicable for the 
subsidiary and not the HQ in the short-term. This is because the challenges of the Nigerian 
institutional environment which were impacting on operations at the HQ were beyond the control 
of the HQ. Thus, the HQ could not try to be like the subsidiary. Hence, divergence rather than 
making efforts to appear like a single-unit enterprise became “the main motivation for having the 
UK subsidiary and the reason why controls were not imposed on the subsidiary” (UK01).  
Our findings contribute to existing discourse in this space (Scott, 2005;Greenwood and Meyer, 
2008;Dacin et al., 2002; Lounsbury, 2008; Kostova et al., 2008). For example, it supports the 
heterogeneity perspective of the NIS theory which suggests that variation in practices originates 
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from the need for organisational actors to act strategically in resistance to institutional forces 
(Lounsbury, 2008).  
An interviewee maintained that:  
“what the subsidiary offers us is expertise at the international level. We have been 
successful domestically, but lack the experience at the international level. That is why the 
crop of experienced staff members that we have at the subsidiary are very important in the 
current scheme of things that management is pursing” (HBS). 
This assertion is supported by an interviewee at the subsidiary who noted as follows: 
“… don’t get me wrong, there are very competent people at the plc (HQ), but most of them 
have not worked outside Nigeria before. There is the usual saying that experience is the 
best teacher, and that is why our being here (UK) is important to the plc (HQ)” (UK2). 
From a regulatory perspective, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which is the UK 
regulator, was perceived by the HQ as a pace-setter in formulating regulations in the industry. 
The FSA’s regulations are far-reaching and impact on global practice. The experience of 
operating in such an environment was considered valuable to the NSMNE. An interviewee noted 
that:  
“…the UK people are …very important to us (NSMNE). Even if what they may be 
requesting for will end up on our tables, having the UK people involved gives them (clients 
and customers) confidence that it will be properly done” (AOM3). 
The HQ is able to retain and attract businesses by referring them to the UK subsidiary, as such 
businesses seek to avoid the challenges of the Nigerian institutional environment and deal with 
more stable foreign enterprises. Hence, without being directly involved in the search for 
opportunities, the subsidiary can contribute to the results of the HQ, which is why the HQ seeks 
to align results, as noted by interviewee (HBS) earlier. That is, the HQ is more concerned with 
the strategic role of the subsidiary; hence, it has limited interest in imposing any financial 
controls.  
Nohria and Ghoshal (1994) described the situation where the HQ adopts a strategy to match the 
subsidiary context rather than integrating the strategies as “differentiated fit” (p.491). Boeker 
(1989), in their study of factors affecting institutionalisation, found that the prevailing 
institutional factors at the time an organisation is founded, influence the strategy that is adopted. 
While the impression from the interviewees indicates that the strategy adopted by the HQ of the 
NSMNE to allow the subsidiary to operate autonomously was deliberate, a regulation requiring 
all foreign branches of foreign companies in the UK to be registered as subsidiaries was the 
reason why the UK subsidiary was incorporated in the first place. This suggests that the UK 
regulation and its timing may have influenced the strategy of NSMNE, and is consistent with the 
findings of Boeker (1989). Scott (2001) argued that organisations respond strategically to the 
impact of the institutional environment, “either by decoupling their structures from their 
operations or by seeking to defend themselves in some manner from the pressure experienced” 
(p.152). The reaction to the institutional environment by decoupling structures is consistent with 
the approach adopted by the HQ of the NSMNE. 
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A reporting structure that enables the HQ to have representatives on the subsidiary’s board of 
directors serves as a channel through which important information about the subsidiary’s 
activities are relayed to management at the HQ. This can be regarded as a substitute for the direct 
use of MCSs. In explaining this, an interviewee noted as follows:  
“So, we have our own board which allows us to be autonomous to a degree, because 
obviously when we have board meetings every quarter, everything is reported to the board 
and the representatives of our parent then take that to the management. So, there is a 
communication link across, so the board interrelates to main board in PLC” (UK2). 
By autonomy, the interviewee (UK2) meant that the subsidiary managers are allowed to use their 
discretion to make decisions regarding the operations of the subsidiary (see for instance, 
Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995). With the subsidiary able to choose how it uses the resources at 
its disposal (technology, human resources, knowledge and finance), controls from the HQ such 
as budgetary and performance targets are not imposed on the subsidiary. In the next section, we 
examine how this subsidiary autonomy shapes the business relationships with the headquarters. 
Institutional factors, subsidiary autonomy and business relationships with the HQ 
The business relationship between the HQ and the subsidiary of NSMNE was also shaped by the 
autonomous status of the subsidiary. While the HQ desires to be seen as a reputable international 
enterprise able to operate in developed economies such as the UK, direct business dealings 
between the HQ and the subsidiary was avoided. For this reason, daily business relationships 
between the HQ and the subsidiary are intermediated through a Nigerian representative/liaison 
office of the subsidiary. Staff from the representative office are accountable to the subsidiary but 
work closely with the HQ to bring business to the subsidiary. Interviewee (UK3) acknowledges 
the representative office role in connecting the subsidiary to the headquarters, as follows: “You 
know we have a Lagos representative office, and they work for us and introduce Nigerian 
customers to London”. However, in some instances, direct relationships involving 
communication of business transactions with branches and the head office at the headquarters do 
occur. These are, however, rare as described by an interviewee below: 
“Basically, the way it works is that, if the transaction originates from a branch, the branch 
will have to ensure it has been successfully executed for the client and that will require 
communicating directly with the subsidiary. For example, if someone sends a mail from the 
subsidiary, and the mail concerns a transaction originating from my desk, I will respond to 
it. It doesn’t happen regularly; it’s been more of a one-off event” (FT1). 
Figure 1 illustrates the business relationship between the HQ and the subsidiary of the NSMNE. 
It shows the representative office in Nigeria, through which customers are referred to the 
subsidiary and business relationships maintained with the headquarters. However, there may be 
instances of direct dealings with the subsidiary. The HQ through one of its branches may also 
have dealings with the UK subsidiary when the services they have rendered to a customer require 
the attention of the subsidiary. In some cases, the HQ may be required to facilitate transactions 
for a customer that has had previous dealings with it and is now referred to the UK subsidiary to 
proceed or take up a different business for the customer. 
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Figure 1- The business relationship between the headquarters and subsidiary of the 
NSMNE  
 
Thus, the Nigerian representative office provides mutual commercial benefits for the HQ and the 
subsidiary. Interviewee (UK5) states that: “this is why it is good to have a big parent as we do, 
they can introduce us to customers - our parent is the best friend that we have because its size 
sort of provides what we call open doors for us into customers.  And they can help us.  Say for 
example our parent is dealing with a company in the UK - I mean big level, they could in effect 
say, hang on, let’s introduce our London subsidiary because they can do some stuff for you”. In 
the NSMNE, the network of relations created between the HQ and the subsidiary through the 
Nigerian representative office provides opportunities for the subsidiary to access customers in 
Nigeria, and provides the HQ with the opportunity to build its profile as an international 
enterprise and gain external legitimacy. Meyer (2008) argued that a “network relation between 
actors is a simple form of organisational institutionalisation, and that such relations may … 
provide opportunities for their activities” (p.793). For example, the UK subsidiary also improves 
local legitimacy and reputation in Nigeria, based on the perception that UK-based enterprises 
possess the capabilities to deliver better quality services than Nigeria (see Agbonifoh and 
Elimimian 1999; Agboli and Ukaegbu, 2006).  
Interviewee UK1 attested to this as follows; “…we may not be generating as much returns to the 
plc ….. but, our presence here give customers a higher level of assurance that I can say has 
enhanced the reputation of the plc”.  
This notion was supported by interviewee HBS who noted that: 
“The value of the UK subsidiary to us (HQ) cannot be overemphasised. As the head of 
business strategy, my team was involved in the development and implementation of the 
plan that led to the establishment of the subsidiary and this plague (shown to interviewer) 
is a testament to value that management places on what we achieved. The move did raise 
Headquarter 
UK subsidiary 
Subsidiary 
Office in 
Nigeria 
Branch Branch 
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our profile and it was a smart one because, just after we achieved it, our competitors 
followed suit”.  
Scott (2001) noted that organisations usually have many network connections and have to 
“decide what criteria to employ to assess similarity” if pressured by the institutional environment 
(p.168). He argues that scholars who take an interest in exploring, how organisations choose to be 
similar and with what organisations, adopt ‘network approaches’. In the next section, we employ 
the social capital theory in understanding the impact of networks of relationships on 
organisational processes.  
Social capital as means of coordination and integration in the absence of imposed controls 
The NSMNE exhibits a form of organisational social capital in the relationship between the HQ 
and the subsidiary. Organisational social capital according to Leana and Van Buren (1999) is a 
resource reflecting the character of social relations within the organization. Our findings show 
that staff members in the NSMNE share relational ties that are useful in addressing individual 
differences and self-interested behaviour. Chenhall et al. (2010) noted that relational ties between 
staff enhance bonding and the flow of information and exchanges between actors, which 
generates social capital. These relationships may also be shared with those external to the 
NSMNE (external networks).  
In this study, it was found that the benefits of such external networks of relationships, went 
beyond the subsidiary network to the HQ. An interviewee explained how ideas and information 
are sourced from external ties as follows: 
 “If it is something that has to do with operations, for example, you will get all the like-
minded people like me all going to the same place, and we will go and say hi to each other, 
and it is very useful for various reasons because, ….  And we talk to others, our peer group, 
similar size, similar business, what are they doing, do you know anybody on there, of 
course you find them and say, guys what are you doing on this issue?” (UK2). 
Another interviewee (UK4) suggests that “information from external sources does not only 
help (the subsidiary) to be better informed about regulations and policies, but is also useful to 
the HQ to get better insight about the policy changes by the regulator and how such policies 
may affect the NSMNE operation as a whole”. Also, positive information from external 
networks of relationship may not only benefit the focal actor that receives the information, but 
may in some cases benefit the broader aggregate (the subsidiary and the HQ in this case) that 
are able to make informed decisions based on such information (Adler and Kwon 2002). 
Furthermore, apart from the external information that was beneficial in the pursuit of 
organisational objectives, the bonding form of social capital between the HQ and the subsidiary 
also helped the NSMNE to regain its market share, which was consistently threatened by local 
competition. An interviewee noted that:  
“The subsidiary has been instrumental in the implementation of our transformation 
agenda and helping us regain our status in the industry. To tell you the truth we were 
losing grounds to these new generation competitors, some of them got to the UK before 
us and were taking big businesses away from us because customers were getting the 
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impression that we were not innovative. We lost about 7% of our market share in a space 
of 5 years and indeed had some catching up to do” (HBS). 
By cooperating and relying on the complimentary capabilities that exist between the HQ and the 
subsidiary and frequently exchanging information, the NSMNE has been able to retain and 
attract customers by offering customers services through the subsidiary. The subsidiary is also 
able to assure big businesses that are reluctant to deal with it because of its size that it can deliver 
the services they need, by making them aware of the size of its parent and its leading place in the 
Nigerian financial services industry. An interviewee noted that:  
“Our parent is a big company which gives us access to big companies that would normally 
not want to do business with us because of our size” (UK4). 
Figure 2 illustrates the complimentary elements that the UK subsidiary and the HQ of the 
NSMNE share. The figure shows the advantages that the HQ has by operating from the UK. 
These advantages mainly stem from the confidence and enhanced reputation that the UK 
institutional environment affords the NSMNE. Despite the size of the subsidiary, it offers the 
NSMNE a unique advantage that compliments some of the disadvantages of operating from a 
less developed country.  
 
Figure 2 Complimentary relationships between the HQ and UK subsidiary 
 
In sum, the HQ does not rely on using formal MCSs to set performance targets for the 
subsidiary, but relies on informal processes that encourage the free flow of information, 
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flexibility and adaptive decision-making. Harzing and Noorderhaven (2006) describe this 
process as “control by socialization and networks” (p.198) which involves building solidarity 
across the organisation. Adler and Kwon (2002, p.29) described solidarity as a benefit of social 
capital that is associated with strong social norms and beliefs, which encourages compliance with 
rules and reduces the need for formal controls. Through this form of controlling and 
coordination, the HQ can share benefits in other forms to boost the overall performance of the 
NSMNE. An interviewee pointed out that “In NSMNE we look at the larger picture; that is what 
we have been trained to do. You look at what will be beneficial to the organisation at large 
(BOM1). 
 Birkinshaw et al. (2000) argued that multinational enterprises may be more concerned about 
worldwide profitability than the specific performance of a subsidiary, thereby focusing on the 
bigger picture of how that could be achieved. By focusing on the larger picture, the NSMNE is 
able to explore opportunities cooperatively by exploiting the organisational social capital that 
exist between the HQ and subsidiary, rather than placing a specific emphasis on subsidiary 
profitability, which often motivates the use of formal MCSs. Relying  on the social capital 
generated from cooperative relationships between individuals and groups not only helps to 
improve overall MNE performance, but is also useful in resolving differences among the various 
actors that are involved in cooperative functions (Masquefa 2008). 
The challenges of social capital reliance 
Tan and Mahoney (2006) as well as Yaping (2003) argued that, having expatriates from the HQ 
in charge of key positions at the subsidiary may be an appropriate way to exercise control and 
integrate the goals of the HQ and subsidiary. However, the NSMNE presents an interesting case, 
where none of the traditional recommendations for dealing with integration and control by 
management and organisational scholars have been applied. On the contrary, the UK subsidiary 
of the NSMNE can use its discretion to make decisions that support the overall corporate 
objectives of the NSMNE. Rather than send expatriates to the subsidiary to head key positions to 
enable the HQ have control of the subsidiary operation, NSMNE has adopted a policy of using 
locals who have the expertise and understanding of the UK institutional environment to manage 
the subsidiary’s operation. This makes the subsidiary autonomous of the HQ. Hence, rather than 
send expatriates to manage the subsidiary operation, staff members have been sourced from the 
UK. Interviewee (UK1) noted that “We employ experienced staff members who have worked in 
other foreign MNEs in the UK. Sometimes, staff members from the HQ are sent for secondment 
duties to gain international experience from the subsidiary. You have to remember that those of 
them at the Plc (HQ) may have a lot of domestic experience, but the UK is the first international 
subsidiary of the NSMNE”.  
This has implication, not only for research but for practice and policy in relation to the use of 
local or expatriate staff to manage the operation of MNEs subsidiary. Yaping (2003) for instance, 
argued that local staffing of the subsidiary could be risky because of the problem of information 
asymmetry. That is, “information available on-site may not be available to a parent company” 
(p.728). This may be more problematic if the subsidiary enjoys greater autonomy that gives its 
accesses to information and specialised knowledge (Hölmstrom, 1979). While social capital has 
been suggested in this research as a means through which the HQ-subsidiary relationship has 
been maintained, there are risks inherent in the social capital relationship that are based on trust, 
reciprocity and shared interest. 
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Tan and Mahoney (2006) found that reliance on the expertise of staff members at the subsidiary 
enables them to resist pressure for better performance from the HQ. For example, the HQ was in 
effect conceding that the subsidiary could not be made to perform better because it operates in a 
different institutional environment. Interviewee (HBS) explained that “the peculiarity or what I 
will call the features of that industry sometimes is a challenge. In the UK, the operating 
environment does not offer more than 12-13% on return on equity. And the group is saying that 
the subsidiaries should at least return 25%, so you discover that your aspiration locally may not 
be able to be met by the subsidiary as a result of the environment. So, you see that because of the 
peculiarity of different businesses, it is sometimes difficult to have the central aspirations that 
will commonly drive the subsidiary, as I said, because they don’t have the same characteristics, 
different businesses in peculiar environments”.  
Adler and Kwon (2002) posit that, the reliance on social capital (trust and reciprocation) as a 
means of controlling subsidiary operations may reduce the incentive for entrepreneurial activities 
that could improve the performance of an enterprise. Social capital scholars argue that this 
constitutes a social capital risk (Leana and Van Buren, 1999, Adler and Kwon, 2002). That is, 
the HQ may be paying a price in return for the social capital-legitimacy and knowledge transfer 
it enjoys. Hansen (2002) for example, found that it took project teams that enjoyed bonding 
social capital among members longer to complete their task than others with weaker ties among 
members. This is because maintaining cordiality in the relationship may make it difficult to 
request better performance from underperforming team members. However, the HQ in this case 
exercises some level of control through the board of directors of the subsidiary that reviews the 
decisions made by the subsidiary management, to ensure that the subsidiary operates per its 
mandate and in the interests of the HQ. 
 
Contributions and Future Research  
This paper examines how differences in the institutional environments of a multinational 
enterprise (MNE) shape the role of MCSs and social capital in the HQ-subsidiary relationship of 
an emerging economy MNE. Contrary to suggestions in the accounting and international 
business literatures, the MCSs of the headquarters have not been imposed on the subsidiary in 
our case study of a Nigerian company with a UK subsidiary. We attribute this to the UK strong 
institutional environment where the subsidiary resides, which did not necessitate a transference 
of MCSs from a weak institutional context based HQ.  Rather, the subsidiary is autonomous and 
allowed to advance business plans and engage in other activities within the mandate from the HQ 
in a way which adds value to the NSMNE. The autonomous status of the subsidiary is a 
deliberate effort of the HQ to present the subsidiary as devoid of the negatives associated with 
operating from the weak institutional context in Nigeria. It helps the HQ to present the subsidiary 
as a UK-based and regulated entity that embodies the values of the UK society. This is important 
because of the perception in the Nigerian institutional environment, that the UK is more 
developed, more organised and has a legal system which is free from interference, unlike the 
case with Nigeria. This research particularly contributes to the literature on MCSs by providing 
insights into how the institutional environments of the MNE may impact the way the HQ of an 
emerging MNE coordinates and integrates the subsidiary operation. It highlights the usefulness 
of the NIS in helping to make sense of the institutional environments in which enterprises 
operate. 
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It also contributes to the literature by highlighting the significance of relational factors on cross-
border integration and the control of business operations in a situation where MCSs are not 
imposed. Through the lens of social capital theory, the study sheds light on the importance of 
social relational factors in shaping the cross-border relationships of an MNE. Organisational 
social capital was particularly found to constitute an important element of the HQ-subsidiary 
relationship at NSMNE, helping in the integration and coordination of the multinational 
operations. However, where social capital becomes the main mechanism of coordination and 
integration of HQ-subsidiary operations, the focus may have to be, as in this case, on the need to 
achieve group goals, rather than specifically designated target goals for the subsidiary. The 
implication of this is that it may limit the potential of the subsidiary to explore its environment 
and search for opportunities. These are important insights into the relationship between 
developed country based subsidiaries and their LDC based HQs. 
However, while the social capital theory has been useful in understanding controls and 
coordination in MNEs, further research might benefit from the exploration of specific ties and 
structures of the relationships. In this way, an understanding of how the position occupied by 
actors in a MNE’s network, impact on the generation or hindrance of social capital will be 
insightful for future studies. Also, further research could be conducted to investigate how social 
capital is implicated in situations of informal control. There is also the need for research aimed at 
understanding the strategic approach that MNEs from LDCs are adopting in their 
internationalisation efforts, and how MCSs are implicated or adapted to the strategy that such 
MNE may choose. Also, the claims that cultural distance may play a part in the use of MCSs for 
coordination and control of subsidiaries operations could be investigated further. For example, 
this could be done with two subsidiaries within the West African sub-region and the UK, using 
multinationals from Africa that operate in both regions. An English-speaking country like Ghana, 
which shares similarities (colonial history and some cultural practices) with Nigeria, may be a 
suitable case study. Where language barriers could be overcomed, a Francophone country within 
the region may also be used to aid comparison as Francophone countries share different colonial 
histories with the English-speaking countries of Africa. 
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